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texture, luminosity, freshness, and so on (see, e.g., Conklin 1955).
Or, if they have no concept of colour, and lack names for colours
as such, they may have words that they use to describe the ap-
pearance of things in terms of what we would designate as colour.
There is, therefore, no “natural” way of classifying colours, no
cross-cultural support for a separate domain of “pure” colours
onto which different languages are mapped. Colours, as we know
them, are not universals of human perceptual experience.
The natural and the normative. Physical nature and human
nature are part of the framework in which we categorise colours.
How the world is and how we are constituted as sentient beings are
preconditions for identification. However, it is the language we
speak that limits our understanding and, in turn, the knowledge we
bring to bear when we categorise. Rather than having their mean-
ings imposed by the constraints of nature, colour words take on
such constraints insofar as these can be put to use for social and
communicative purposes, that is, insofar as they are meaningful.
This inverts the assumed priority of things. The received (Platonis-
tic) view takes colour categorisation to be the outcome of attaching
labels to an ordered set of focal colours that are naturally salient to
our visual system, then generalising to similar instances. However,
although aspects of our conceptual scheme depend upon our neu-
robiology, the former cannot be elucidated in neural terms. The cri-
teria for explaining the colours of our scheme are logically distinct
from the physiology of the enabling system. Practical purposes es-
tablish pertinences. For example, although our colour sense en-
ables us to distinguish blues from greens, it is only if we have a use
for this distinction, only if it serves a communicative purpose, that
we make it meaningful. Those colours that are important for us are
selectively and differentially attended to by our culture. Thus we
distinguish blues from greens, whereas other cultures, for whom
this distinction is not important, see these as the same colour, as be-
longing to the same category. Colour, though visually salient, is not
conceptually salient until cultural development makes it so through
the acknowledgment of colours. It is the need for any conceptual
scheme for colours to be socially accessible that explains the bio-
logical correlates and cultural regularities of such schemes.
Nontrivial constraints on colour categorisation must exist if we
are to explain why people within a culture talk about and com-
municate by means of colour. However, such constraints are to be
found in the logic of particular colour grammars.
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Abstract: Colour word usage within languages follows the same ordering
as that proposed by Berlin and Kay between languages. This provides ad-
ditional validation and support for Berlin and Kay’s schema.
In a recent commentary (McManus 1997a) on the target article by
Saunders and van Brakel (1997t) (S&vB). I tried to make the sub-
stantive point that the Berlin and Kay (1969) ordering of colour
words between languages is in part validated by the appearance of
the same ordering on the usage of words within languages, citing
studies of my own (McManus 1983; 1997b) and others (Hays et al.
1972) on a range of languages, including Chinese. In addition I
made some minor comments, as did others, about an “appearance
of sloppiness” (S&vB’s original phrase) in their own work.
In their reply Saunders & van Brakel (1997r) chose to ignore
the question of variation within languages due to “marginality”
(their Table R2). Instead, under the heading of “Sloppiness” they
claimed that:
McManus indicates that he has reported data on the frequency of
colour words in Chinese poetry, which would lend support to Berlin and
Kay’s (1969) order of evolutionary antiquity. Table 1 and Figure 1 of Mc-
Manus’s (1983) data are labelled “Chinese poetry” (Chou & Chen
1935). However, Chou & Chen (1935) say nothing about Chinese po-
etry, providing data only on colour preferences of Chinese students
(p. 214).
I am not sure whether this comment was put under its heading
with ironic intent, but sloppiness seems here to be self-referential,
because on p. 301 of their paper Chou and Chen (1935) clearly
state: “Ouyang (10) and J. Y. Chen (3) had counted the frequency
of various color words contained in Chinese poems and prose. The
frequencies of appearance in Chinese literature of our nine colors
are shown in Table 7.” Table 7 then sums the data from the two
colours and provides a rank ordering. It is these summed data that
I used in my 1983 paper.
Perhaps now that the precise reference to the frequency of
colour word usage in Chinese has been spelled out, and similar
data have also been cited for English, Spanish, French, German,
Russian, Romanian, and Hebrew, S&vB could address the sub-
stantive issue? Does now what would otherwise seem an inexplic-
able coherence of ordering within a range of different languages
actually provide strong support for the ordering of Berlin and Kay
(1969)? If it does not, then some alternative explanation of the
data must be provided.
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Abstract: Saunders and van Brakel’s observation that “linguistic evidence
provides no grounds for the universality of basic color categories” also ap-
plies to the concept of “colour” itself. The language of “seeing” is rooted
in human experience, and its basic frame of reference is provided by the
universal rhythm of “light” days and “dark” nights and by the fundamen-
tal and visually salient features of human environment: the sky, the sun,
vegetation, fire, the sea, the naked earth.
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